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Fields of Concentration: Political Economy, Development

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Comprehensive Examinations Completed:

2019 (Oral): Development, Labor

2018 (Written): Macroeconomics, Microeconomics

Dissertation Title: *Essays on political economy and gender*

Committee:

Professor Rohini Pande (Chair)

Professor Gerard Padró i Miquel

Professor Ebonya Washington

Degrees:

Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2023 (expected)

M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2020

M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2020

M.A., Economics, Universidad Católica Chile 2016

B.A., Economics, Universidad Católica Chile 2016

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

2021-2022 University Dissertation Fellowship, Yale University

2019-2022 Ryouchi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship

2017-2022 Yale University Fellowship

2017-2022 Cowles Foundation and Economics Growth Center Fellowship

2016 Academic Excellence Award, M.A. Economics Universidad Católica

2015 Academic Excellence Scholarship, Government of Chile

Research Grants:

2022 MacMillan Dissertation Research Grant
2021 Cowles Foundation Research Grant
2021 Economic Growth Center Dissertation Research Grant
2021 Sylff Research Grant

Teaching Experience:

Fall 2021, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Cormac O’Dea, Introduction to microeconomics, Yale College (Undergraduate)
Spring 2021, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Eva Chalioti, Intermediate microeconomics, Yale College (Undergraduate)
Fall 2020, Teaching Assistant to Prof. Mira Frick and Soenje Reiche, Intermediate microeconomics, Yale College (Undergraduate)

Research and Work Experience:

2019-2020 Research Assistant, to Prof. Rohini Pande and Nicholas Ryan, Yale University
2016 Research Assistant, to Prof. Juan-Pablo Montero and Hugo Silva, PUC Chile
2012-2016 Research Assistant, to Prof. Francisco Gallego, PUC Chile

Working Papers:

“Gender quotas and strategic voters: Experimental evidence from Chile’s constitutional convention” (September 2022), *Job Market Paper*

Work In Progress

“Selection into politics: The effect of gender quotas”
“Can dictatorships improve the representation of women? Evidence from the transition to democracy in Chile”
“The effects of driving restrictions in the vehicular flow”, with Francisco Gallego, and Hugo E. Silva

Seminar and Conference Presentations: NEUDC conference (2022), Pontificia Universidad Católica Alumni Workshop (2021), ITEA Annual Conference and School on Transportation Economics (2016), Sociedad Chilena de Economía SECHI (2016)

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References:

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Gender quotas and strategic voters: Evidence from Chile's constitutional convention [Job Market Paper]

Do voters respond strategically to different electoral system designs, as they trade-off preferences across multiple dimensions of candidate identity? Furthermore, is the strategic response impacting the competence of elected legislators and policy outcomes? In this paper, I use a voter information experiment and administrative data to provide causal evidence on voters' strategic behavior in the presence of a gender quota.

My analysis exploits a unique electoral setting in Chile: the election of members of Chile's constitutional convention. Gender quotas were used in this context to ensure gender parity in electoral lists and elected seats. As a result, election results in each district were adjusted to ensure gender equality without limiting voters' choices: voters could vote for any candidate, regardless of gender.

The information campaign consisted of a letter that provided general information about the election, gender parity, and an example of how equal gender representation will be achieved. Because election results are disaggregated at the voting booth, randomization was performed at that level.

First, I test the hypothesis that in the presence of quotas, citizens' choices are partisan and strategic. I contend that a gender parity quota causes strategic partisan voters to change their chosen candidate based on which gender they believe will benefit the most in their party. Consistent with strategic voting, voters from traditional parties (which traditionally favored male candidates) increased their votes for women by about three percentage points. Among independent coalitions (that favored female candidates), women's vote share fell by about two percentage points.

Second, after moving away from their party's preferred gender, I examine whether a strategic voter shifts their attention to the candidate's competence, as proxied by test scores for college admissions. This proxy has previously been used in the literature due to its positive correlation with other political efficiency outcomes, such as citizen satisfaction and local public-finance outcomes (Besley et al., 2017). In Chile, test scores positively correlate with vote share, support for independent candidates, and the likelihood of being elected as president or vice president of the constitutional convention. I investigate whether gender quota information impacted candidates' vote shares based on their test scores. I find that the competence of men from traditional parties improves as men with low test scores lose votes, while the competence of women remains stable.

Selection into politics: The effect of gender quotas

In this paper, I explore how gender shapes political selection into politics. By using a comprehensive dataset of the Chilean population, I study how candidates and elected officials are differentially selected and how a gender quota affects the type of candidate and elected politician. I have four findings. First, candidates and elected officials of both genders are positively selected. Second, before the gender quota was implemented, women were more positively selected than men. The gender gap in candidate selection disappeared after the implementation of the gender quota, but women officials are still more positively selected than men. Third, after the gender quota was implemented, both male and female candidates became more socioeconomically representative of the population. Fourth, parties respond to the gender quota by putting more women in districts where their party performs poorly.

Can dictatorships improve women's representation? Evidence from Chile's democratic transition

Transitions from dictatorship to democracy can help us understand how various political contexts can favor marginalized groups in gaining representation. This project aims to investigate the effects of Chile's transition from dictatorship to democracy on gender representation. During Chile's dictatorship (1973 to 1990), dictator Augusto Pinochet suspended the constitution and appointed mayors to each municipality. During the dictatorship's final years, women made up nearly 20% of the designated mayors. When democratic elections were held, the percentage of women fell by about 15 percentage points. This paper seeks to comprehend the long-term impact of women's exclusion following the dictatorship for political representation of women and public policies. Preliminary analysis shows that during the dictatorship, a similar percentage of male and female mayors ran for office (40%), with a higher number of men running for higher positions (congress and senate). Furthermore, for the first three elections after the dictatorship, the number of female candidates in the right-wing party (supporters of the dictatorship) was significantly higher than in the left-wing party.